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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, 5.85 million people were disenfranchised because of 
felony convictions as of 2010.1  No other democratic country in the world 
disenfranchises more people, in both total numbers and population 
percentage, because of criminal convictions.2  Unlike countless other voting 
restrictions and regulations contested in the courts,3 felon disenfranchisement 
laws have long been a constitutionally viable method of limiting suffrage in 
the United States.4  Further, discussion of felon disenfranchisement—until 
recently—has escaped thorough debate.5  Yet, despite the long history of 
criminal disenfranchisement in the United States, and the possible value such 
laws provide to the democratic process, any category of law that restricts 
suffrage to such a significant extent should be subject to heightened judicial 
review and vigorously debated.  
Like most voting regulations in the United States, felon 
disenfranchisement provisions are made at the state level.6  Two states, 
Maine and Vermont, allow individuals to vote while they are in prison, 
placing virtually no regulation on suffrage relative to criminal convictions.7  
                                                                                                                   
 1 JEAN CHUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER 1 
(2015), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fdFelony%20Disenfranchis 
ement%20Primer.pdf. 
 2 See LALEH ISPAHANI, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, OUT OF STEP WITH THE WORLD: 
AN ANALYSIS OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE U.S. AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES 33 
(2006), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/assed_upload_fil 
e25_25663.pdf (“Disenfranchisement of people with criminal convictions is not the 
democratic norm.”). 
 3 See generally Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (holding all states are prohibited 
from imposing any voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or any standards, practices, 
or procedures which result in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote of any citizen who 
is a member of a protected class); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 
(1966) (holding a poll tax was “invidious discrimination” that violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583, 586 (1964) 
(affirming the district court’s decision to invalidate existing and proposed plans for the 
apportionment of Alabama’s bicameral legislature because the plans violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 4 CHUNG, supra note 1, at 1.  
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 6 CHUNG, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 7 CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, SARAH SHANNON & JEFF MANZA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 
STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 2010  
(2012), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/State-Lev 
el-Estimates-of-Felon-Disenfranchisement-in-the-United-States-2010.pdf. 
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In the United States, these states are outliers.8  The majority of states place 
voting restrictions on individuals who are not incarcerated but continue to be 
under state supervision through probation or parole.9  A significant minority 
of states continue to restrict voting rights after an individual has completely 
served his sentence;10 a subset of these states prohibit access to the ballot 
indefinitely for individuals convicted of a felony.11  
Although voting regulations continue to be firmly within the competence 
of state governments, significant and unprecedented federal oversight of such 
regulations became a unique hallmark of modern voting laws beginning in 
the Civil Rights Era.12  Significantly, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the 
Supreme Court’s changing view of constitutional protections resulted in 
numerous federally required changes to state election law in the latter half of 
the twentieth century.13  Central to such new federal regulation was the 
notion of the necessity to protect voting rights for marginalized minorities, 
particularly African-Americans, who had previously been subject to 
discriminatory treatment under the election laws of many states.14  
Like many facially neutral state election regulations invalidated by the 
Voting Rights Act, felon disenfranchisement laws share the quality of 
disproportionately affecting minority populations in the United States.15  This 
is an unavoidable consequence of the current American criminal justice 
system, a system that continues to disproportionately convict and incarcerate 
racial minorities.16  For a myriad of reasons—from practical realties of how 
                                                                                                                   
 8 Id. at 3 tbl.1. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id.  
 11 Id. (listing Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming 
as states that disenfranchise all convicted felons and do not have waiting periods). 
 12 Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Law, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice. 
gov/crt/introduction-federal-voting-rights-laws. 
 13 See generally Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding the plaintiff’s claim of 
gerrymandering fell under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Allen 
v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (holding state election laws are subject to the 
approval requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965). 
 14 Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, supra note 12. 
 15 UGGEN, SHANNON & MANZA, supra note 7, at 10–11. 
 16 See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 8 (2014), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf.   
Almost 3% of black male U.S. residents of all ages were imprisoned on 
December 31, 2013 (2,805 inmates per 100,000 black male U.S. residents), 
compared to 1% of Hispanic males (1,134 per 100,000) and 0.5% of white 
males (466 per 100,000). . . . Black males had higher imprisonment rates 
across all age groups than all other races and Hispanic males.  In the age 
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local police departments target crime to systemic failures of due process such 
as the misuse of preemptory strikes in jury selection and a currently 
overstrained right to effective assistance of counsel—the American criminal 
justice system convicts and incarcerates a greater relative portion of African- 
Americans than any other subset of the population.17  Thus, this group is 
most acutely impacted by felon disenfranchisement.  Whether this should be 
accepted by a nation with a living memory of state mandated differential 
treatment of minority populations, considering further the implications and 
context of such treatment, is a matter deserving of significant political 
debate.   
Although the Civil Rights movement in the United States launched 
changes and reforms in race relations that continue to this day, no democratic 
country has confronted the effects of the differential treatment of citizens 
based on race and group status in the modern era like South Africa.  When 
the death knell of Apartheid was finally heard, South Africa became a nation 
reborn.18  Political leaders in South Africa enacted an entirely new 
constitutional regime, premised primarily on the need to end the historic 
oppression of minorities and to construct a new democracy free of the 
discrimination central to the Apartheid government.19  This process required 
nothing short of near total re-invention.  The modern reimagining and 
reconstruction of the democratic ideal seen in the South African 
Constitution—and subsequent interpretive jurisprudence—presents a 
powerful point of comparison to the aging Western model, itself subject to 
the unfortunate warts and bruises of history.  
                                                                                                                   
range with the highest imprisonment rates for males (ages 25 to 39), black 
males were imprisoned at rates at least 2.5 times greater than Hispanic males 
and 6 times greater than white males.  For males ages 18 to 19—the age 
range with the greatest difference in imprisonment rates between whites and 
blacks—black males (1,092 inmates per 100,000 black males) were more 
than 9 times more likely to be imprisoned than white males (115 inmates per 
100,000 white males). 
Id.  
 17 Id. 
 18 The End of Apartheid, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ 
pcw/98678.htm. 
 19 MARK S. KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE 
UNITED STATES 29–30 (2009). 
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In April 1994, South Africa held universally free, open democratic 
elections for the first time since the rise of Apartheid.20  It was the first 
election in the country’s history in which all races could freely participate.21  
The presidential candidate elected, Nelson Mandela, had been released from 
prison only four years earlier, after being incarcerated for twenty-seven years 
and stripped of his fundamental rights, including his right to vote, by the then 
reigning Apartheid regime.22  This powerful symbol was not lost on the new 
South African government.  In the wake of Apartheid, the South African 
government tackled its history of racial oppression by drafting a new, 
transformative, non-discriminatory constitution to govern their republic.23  
Brought into law in 1996, the Constitution of South Africa protects an 
impressively expansive array of political and social rights;24 it is now 
considered a high-water mark among democratic constitutions throughout 
the world.25 
Section 19(3) of the Constitution of South Africa provides that “every 
adult citizen has the right to vote in elections for any legislative body 
established in terms of the Constitution.”26  This bedrock of universal 
suffrage has allowed the South African Constitutional Court to consistently 
protect access to the ballot.  Two landmark Constitutional Court cases 
involving prisoners’ right to vote have given further support to the strength 
of universal suffrage.27  In August v. Electoral Commission, the South 
African Constitutional Court wrote:  
                                                                                                                   
 20 See HASSEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A NATION: CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
176 (1998) (describing the elections that took place between April 27–29, 1994 as “peaceful,” 
“free,” and “fair”). 
 21 This Day In History: South Africa Holds First Multiracial Elections, HISTORY.COM, http:// 
www.history.com/this-day-in-history/south-africa-holds-first-multiracial-elections. 
 22 Id.  
 23 KENDE, supra note 19, at 34 (describing the “Interim Constitution”). 
 24 Id. at 6–7 (characterizing the South African Constitution as more progressive than the 
U.S. Constitution because it provides for and protects certain rights and liberties that are not 
within the direct scope of the U.S. Constitution such as prohibiting discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, authorizing affirmative action, and providing a right to healthcare and a 
right to unionize).   
 25 See generally CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Alec 
C. Ewald & Brandon Rottinghaus eds., 2009). 
 26 S. AFR. CONST. § 19, 1996, available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/imag 
es/a108-96.pdf. 
 27 See generally Minister of Home Affairs v. NICRO 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) (S. Afr.), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/10.pdf; August v. Electoral Comm’n 
1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1999/3.pdf. 
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The achievement of the franchise [of universal adult sufferage] 
has historically been important both for the acquisition of the 
rights of full and effective citizenship by all South Africans 
regardless of race, and for the accomplishment of an all-
embracing nationhood . . . The vote of each and every citizen is 
a badge of dignity and of personhood.  Quite literally, it says 
that everybody counts.28 
Although neither August nor subsequent case law stand for the notion that 
the right to vote is absolute and can never be limited by government 
regulation, South African case law evidences support for a high bar to the 
lawful imposition of any such limitation.29  
The South African approach to criminal disenfranchisement is admirable 
and instructive.  Rejecting the institutionalized racial discrimination of its 
recent past, South Africa has embraced the modern variant of the democratic 
ideal.30  Since its formation, the South African Constitutional Court has 
conducted thorough and careful interpretation of their constitution—and the 
rights afforded and protected therein—with regard to many issues and areas 
of the law.31  In South Africa’s constitutional backdrop, if not always 
explicitly or emphatically mentioned, rests the notion of an important 
vigilance in ensuring that any formal vestiges of racial oppression are 
identified and eradicated.32  
Imprisonment has a particularly complex and unfortunate history in South 
Africa.  Under Apartheid, imprisonment was routinely used as a means to 
organize society along racial lines, impose social control, and restrict 
political reform and debate.33  Perhaps in part because of an awareness of this 
                                                                                                                   
 28 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) para. 17 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAC 
C/19 99/3.pdf. 
 29 Id. 
 30 KENDE, supra note 19, at ix, 8. 
 31 See id. at 9–10 (describing South Africa’s progressive approach to many human rights 
issues). 
 32 See, e.g., S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993 art. 251, available at  http://www.gov.za/docume 
nts/constitution/constitution-republc-south-africa-act-200-1993 (“This Constitution provides a 
historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, 
untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, 
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, 
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.”). 
 33 Lukas Muntingh & Julia Sloth-Nielsen, The Ballot as a Bulwark: Prisoners’ Right to 
Vote in South Africa, in CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
221 (Alec C. Ewald & Brandon Rottinghaus eds., 2009). 
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history, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has applied a careful rigor 
to their task of judicial upkeep of South Africa’s constitutional guarantees.  
The Constitutional Court has not sought to provide quick judgments in 
atonement for its recent past but rather has issued opinions offering a careful 
and balanced analysis of contested law and its relation to the rights protected 
under their new constitution.34  Pointedly, the Constitutional Court, while not 
establishing an absolute right to vote, has consistently invalidated attempts to 
place restrictions on access to the ballot, even for individuals currently 
incarcerated.35 
The judicial approach generally used by the United States in evaluating 
issues of constitutionality is quite similar to that employed by South Africa.  
In the realm of felon disenfranchisement, however, the end result of those 
similar approaches has been markedly different.36  The highest courts of both 
countries have allowed, or allowed for the possibility of, the restriction of 
voting rights in some circumstances.  Thus, both courts recognize and affirm 
the principle that in democratic society the right to vote is not absolute.  The 
engines of these limitations are unique to their respective countries, but it is 
relevant that both regard the legitimacy of criminal disenfranchisement to 
depend on a balance of qualified constitutional rights and a potentially 
legitimate, limited government interest in their restriction.37  
Many similarities exist between the major social and political battles 
fought over race in the United States and South Africa in the twentieth 
century.38  The countries share a long, common history of racial subjugation 
                                                                                                                   
 34 KENDE, supra note 19, at 10. 
 35 Minister of Home Affairs v. National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-
Integration of Offenders (NICRO) 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) paras. 65–67 (s. Afr.); August v. 
Electoral Comm’n 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 36 Compare Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding a California felon 
disenfranchisement law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment), with August v. Electoral Comm’n 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) para. 31 (S. Afr.) (stating 
felon disenfranchisement is unconstitutional in South Africa absent legitimate legislation to 
the contrary). 
 37 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding that a California felon 
disenfranchisement law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Minister of Home Affairs v. NICRO (3) SA 280 (CC) paras. 65–67 (S. Afr.) 
(holding that without more justification the felon disenfranchisement law at issue was 
unconstitutional). 
 38 See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts: 
Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.  479 (1990) (discussing the failure of the 
South African courts in the Apartheid era and the separate but shared experiences related to 
racial discrimination in the American and South African courts).  
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and purposeful marginalization of racial minority groups.39  In both 
countries, law sanctioned overt discrimination while presiding governments 
took an explicit and active role in the practice of racial oppression.40  
Fortunately, both countries have also fought to overcome this shameful 
history and assert the existence of a nation reborn, its institutions no longer 
afflicted by the racial discrimination of its past.41  Yet, despite these laudable 
aspirations, the modern political reality of both South Africa and the United 
States indicates that this shared dream of equality has not been fully realized. 
In addition to this common social and political backdrop, there are also 
informative commonalities between the governmental structures of both 
nations.  South Africa and the United States are constitution-based 
democratic republics.  The Constitution of South Africa was modeled in part 
on the United States Constitution, but would ultimately further advance the 
notion of what constitutes fundamental and inalienable democratic rights.42  
Indeed, the Constitution of South Africa is considered by some scholars to 
provide the most expansive constitutional protections in the world.43  The 
Constitutional Court of South Africa is also roughly analogous to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, with a similar political role, multi-
member composition, and judicial process.44  Both countries’ highest courts 
have been actors in social change through the process of interpreting the 
boundaries of the fundamental rights afforded by their respective 
constitutions.45  Thus, these commonalities present a functional and 
instructive backdrop that encourages effective comparative analysis between 
                                                                                                                   
 39 Id. at 486–87. 
 40 Id. at 545–46, 573–82. 
 41 Id. at 573–82. 
 42 KENDE, supra note 19, at 6. 
 43 Id. at 4 (citing CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY, WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 261 
(2001)). 
 44 Id. at 8–10.  One importance difference between the courts is that the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa decides only constitutional questions. In this way, it has a more narrow 
and specific focus than the U.S. Supreme Court.  Id. at 10. 
 45 See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding states are required to 
provide indigent criminal defendants with legal counsel pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments); Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. 
Afr.) (holding that the state is constitutionally obligated to provide affirmative assistance to 
those experiencing extreme poverty and homelessness, including but not limited to assistance 
in the provision of adequate housing); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (holding 
state laws establishing separate but equal segregated public schools unconstitutional under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
410 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 44:401 
 
 
the criminal disenfranchisement case law, and corresponding constitutional 
bedrock, of the United States and South Africa.  
Importantly, South Africa—though committed to its constitution and the 
ideals of freedom, dignity, and equality—is not a democratic utopia.  South 
Africa continues to experience high unemployment,46 high levels of violent 
crime,47 and general economic contraction.48  The latter two of these 
conditions have both been cited by South Africa legislators in defense of 
restrictions on prisoners’ rights to vote.49  Nonetheless, the South African 
Constitutional Court has recognized that the right to vote exists above such 
state interests—above mere partisan, political maneuvering to appear tough 
on crime or cognizant and protective of economic interests—and can only be 
restricted with substantial factual findings of state necessity.50  In South 
Africa, the right to vote seemingly rests on particularly intractable, though 
not completely impenetrable, constitutional ground.51  
The situation in the United States is very different.  Although there is a 
considerable amount of federal law protecting the right to vote, felon 
disenfranchisement has essentially been accepted by the federal courts.52  
This Note argues that this unquestioned acceptance should not stand.  
Though these restrictions are based, at least in part, on enumerated 
allowances within the Constitution,53 the ideals of democracy demand a 
reexamination of the legal framework used to analyze current felon 
disenfranchisement provisions.  In recent years, the American political 
landscape has again been increasingly embroiled in a highly visible political 
debate questioning the racial neutrality of both the criminal justice system 
                                                                                                                   
 46 Patrick McGroarty, South Africa Unemployment Hits 11-Year High, WALL ST. J. (May 26, 
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/south-africa-unemployment-hits-11-year-high-1432640795. 
 47 See Why South Africa is (a bit) Less Violent Than You Might Think, ECONOMIST (Apr. 13, 
2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/04/economist-explains-5?zi 
d=317&ah=8a47fc455a44945580198768fad0fa41/ (explaining that despite high levels of 
violent crime, crime rates are falling in South Africa). 
 48 Linda Yueh, The Jobs Challenge Facing South Africa, BBC NEWS (May 9, 2014), http:// 
www.bbc.com/news/business-27337520.  
 49 Minister of Home Affairs v. NICRO, 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) paras. 40, 54 (S. Afr.). 
 50 Id. paras. 65–67. 
 51 Id.; August v. Electoral Comm’n, 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 52 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding a California felon 
disenfranchisement law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 53 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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and various state electoral laws.54  Felon disenfranchisement laws touch both 
of these issues.  Moreover, these laws are highly relevant in their potential to 
distort the composition of the voting electorate and perversely influence the 
governing political agenda.55 
The United States could benefit from utilizing an approach similar to that 
of South Africa–by balancing the individual’s rights to vote and the state’s 
ability to limit that right—when analyzing constitutional challenges to 
criminal disenfranchisement laws.  Specifically, the federal courts of the 
United States should recognize the democratic value of the strong suffrage 
rights supported by the Constitution of South Africa.  The sheer number of 
persons affected by criminal disenfranchisement laws in the United States 
provides further urgency to this matter.56  The ongoing discriminatory impact 
of criminal disenfranchisement in the United States collides with the notion 
of an evolving democratic ideal to provide compelling cause to re-evaluate 
these laws and to consider the judgment of other, similarly situated 
democratic countries.  Finally, with the ever-present backdrop of race, it is 
vital to consider the practical consequences, however unpleasant or 
politically and socially stigmatized, of felon disenfranchisement.  
This Note argues the current state of felon disenfranchisement laws in the 
United States fails to satisfy the modern democratic ideal and should be 
freshly assessed, debated and, ultimately, reformed.  Further, this Note posits 
that—in an area of law dominated by history, race, and fundamental notions 
of democracy—the relatively recent transformation in South Africa provides 
a particularly vital and effective point for comparative analysis of the legal 
structure that supports criminal disenfranchisement in the United States.  
Part II of this Note examines felon disenfranchisement laws in the United 
States, including their evolution through the Reconstruction Era to the 
modern form of facially race neutral laws currently classified as non-punitive 
regulation only secondarily linked to criminal conviction.  Part II further 
illustrates that the United States is an outlier among democratic nations 
regarding the prevalence and severity of felon disenfranchisement laws.  
                                                                                                                   
 54 See generally Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (holding the 
state interests in support of an Indiana statute requiring voters to present state issued 
identification to vote outweighed the potential impositions on voters); Frank v. Walker, 768 
F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding a Wisconsin voter identification requirement did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause or the Voting Rights Act). 
 55 CHUNG, supra note 1, at 5 (“One study found that disenfranchisement policies likely 
affected the results of seven U.S. Senate races from 1970 to 1998 as well as the hotly 
contested 2000 Bush–Gore presidential election.”). 
 56 Id. at 3 (stating that the criminal disenfranchisement rate rose to 5.85 million by 2010). 
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Finally, Part II enumerates and analyzes the traditional legal claims pursued 
by individuals in the United States attempting to challenge felon 
disenfranchisement laws as unconstitutional. 
Part III of this Note focuses on the re-invention of the democratic ideal in 
post-Apartheid South Africa; specifically discussing the effect this process 
has had on criminal disenfranchisement laws.  Part III begins with an 
overview of the content and structure of the Constitution of South African 
and discusses how South Africa’s Constitutional Court interprets this 
document.  This section devotes specific attention to the notion of 
transformative constitutionalism emphasized by leading judicial authorities 
in South Africa.  Finally, Part III examines two important decisions by the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa concerning criminal disenfranchisement 
and will analyze the implications of these holdings within the broader 
framework of the modern democratic ideal.  
Part IV of this Note argues that there is a useful comparison between both 
the history of racial discrimination and the current state of criminal 
disenfranchisement in the United States and South Africa.  Part IV begins 
with a brief assessment of why this shared history of racial oppression allows 
for effective comparative analysis.  Next, this section discusses the 
relationship between the South African notion of transformative 
constitutionalism and the influence and weight of history.  Finally, Part IV 
proposes a new path forward for the consideration of criminal 
disenfranchisement laws by the federal courts of the United States.  
II.  BACKGROUND [U.S.] 
A.  The Changing Face and Form of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in the 
United States 
Criminal disenfranchisement laws have changed considerably in character 
and application throughout the history of the United States.  Criminal 
disenfranchisement laws were originally intended to be individualized and 
explicitly punitive measures used to protect the perceived purity of the 
electorate.57  After the Civil War, felon disenfranchisement laws took on a 
new, more nefarious shape.  Many states, particularly those in the former 
Confederacy, used criminal disenfranchisement as a tool to maintain the 
                                                                                                                   
 57 Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement 
Law in the United States, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 1045, 1082. 
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white-dominated, political status quo and to insulate white southerners from 
the political influence of newly freed blacks.58  The position of state election 
laws within the dual sovereign system of the United States also made it so 
this practice would be largely immune from federal intervention, particularly 
in the years after the Supreme Court’s dismantling of the Civil Rights Act of 
1875.59  Criminal disenfranchisement provisions were thus used in this 
manner for nearly a century throughout the American South.  
The overtly racist implementation and restructuring of felon 
disenfranchisement laws in the years following the Civil War is no longer the 
norm; yet, because of the historical prevalence of these laws and the modern 
inequities of the criminal justice system, they continue to have a startlingly 
discriminatory effect.60  At present, this empirically proven reality has not 
persuaded the federal courts.  The current position of the Supreme Court 
(originating in oft-repeated dicta) is that criminal disenfranchisement is a 
collateral consequence of criminal conviction and is not inherently 
punitive.61  The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of felon 
disenfranchisement on all but one occasion.62  With this considerable hurdle, 
litigants have still attempted to challenge criminal disenfranchisement in 
federal and state courts, almost uniformly without ultimate success.63  Felon 
                                                                                                                   
 58 Id. at 1090.  
 59 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (holding Enforcement Act penalties 
for depriving or conspiring to deprive the right to vote cannot be enforced against private 
citizens). 
 60 CHUNG, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 61 One example of the Supreme Court’s position can be found in a case involving 
citizenship rights following military desertion.  In Trop v. Dulles, Chief Justice Warren, in 
dicta, stated  
A person who commits a bank robbery, for instance, loses his right to liberty 
and often his right to vote.  If, in the exercise of the power to protect banks, 
both sanctions were imposed for the purpose of punishing bank robbers, the 
statutes authorizing both disabilities would be penal.  But because the 
purpose of the latter statute is to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility 
for voting, this law is sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the power to 
regulate the franchise. 
356 U.S. 96 (1958).   
 62 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (holding an Alabama criminal 
disenfranchisement law unconstitutional because it was enacted with a racially discriminatory 
intent and had a correspondingly discriminatory impact). 
 63 See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan III), 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(per curiam) (holding a state disenfranchisement statute did not violate the Voting Rights Act 
because the plaintiffs did not present evidence of intentional discrimination in the state’s 
criminal law system); Danielson v. Dennis, 139 P.3d 688 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (holding a 
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disenfranchisement laws in the United States today are automatic and 
invisible machinations of the criminal justice system—vis-à-vis electoral 
regulations enacted by the state—making them particularly difficult to 
challenge constitutionally.  Yet, despite this reality, it is imperative that such 
a significant and intractable form of disenfranchisement does not escape 
careful review.  
1.  Criminal Disenfranchisement Prior to the Civil War 
Criminal disenfranchisement had a vastly different form in the early 
history of the United States.64  Disenfranchisement, seen as a discrete 
punishment, applied only to those serious crimes that indicated an individual 
lacked the moral virtue to be a participating member of society.65  The 
judiciary, on an individualized basis, primarily dictated the terms and 
imposition of this punishment; this judicial autonomy was consistent until 
later reform in the time immediately prior to and following the Civil War.66 
Although the application of felon disenfranchisement laws was limited in 
the early history of the United States, the ability to disenfranchise because of 
certain criminal convictions was nearly ubiquitous among the several 
states.67  By 1821, eleven of the original colonies had adopted some form of 
felon disenfranchisement laws in their individual state constitutions.68  
Importantly, a wide variety of disenfranchisement was the norm at this time.  
Voting was regarded as a selective privilegewomen, men without property, 
blacks, and other marginalized groups were commonly excluded from 
participation in the political process.69  Despite the ubiquity of voting 
restrictions in the early history of the United States, wholesale criminal 
                                                                                                                   
Colorado disenfranchisement law preventing parolees from voting constitutional because the 
parolees had not served their full imprisonment term). 
 64 See Ewald, supra note 57, at 1061–66 (discussing the history of criminal 
disenfranchisement laws prior to the Civil War).  
 65 Id. at 1061–64. 
 66 Id. at 1062, 1065–66. 
 67 Id. at 1062–63. 
 68 Matthew E. Feinberg, Suffering Without Suffrage: Why Felon Disenfranchisement 
Constitutes Vote Denial Under Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, 8 HASTINGS RACE & 
POVERTY L.J. 61, 65 (2011). 
 69 Ewald, supra note 57, at 1064. 
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disenfranchisement as practiced today was completely foreign to early 
American society.70  
The practice of selective suffrage indicates that racial discrimination was 
not at the core of pre-Civil War criminal disenfranchisement.71  Instead, 
criminal disenfranchisement was viewed as a unique punishment enacted to 
protect against undue corruption of the qualified and upstanding electorate 
by excluding individuals who lacked moral virtue.72  For this reason, most 
state criminal disenfranchisement laws focused on crimes demonstrating 
serious violation of the moral code: crimes that were “infamous,” 
“notoriously scandalous,” or otherwise indicative of personal corruption or 
moral bankruptcy.73 
2.  In the Aftermath of the Civil War: Reconstruction and the Introduction 
of Race in Laws of Criminal Disenfranchisement  
The end of the Civil War brought profound change to the legal order of 
voting rights in the United States, particularly in the former Confederate 
states.  In the “relatively brief but extraordinary period of black advancement 
known as the Reconstruction Era,” landmark federal legislation abolished 
slavery, bestowed full citizenship upon African-Americans, mandated due 
process and equal protection of the laws for all citizens, and prohibited the 
denial of the right to vote on the basis of race.74  This was a major change for 
the entire country, but was felt most acutely in the Southern states.  Indeed, 
with the creation of a new, numerous, and potentially powerful black 
electorate, the still-embedded ruling power structure of the Southern states 
sought new methods for maintaining political and social control.75  Eventual 
Secretary of Treasury Carter Glass, while serving as a delegate to the 
Virginia convention in 1906, stated “[w]e are here to discriminate to the very 
                                                                                                                   
 70 See generally id. at 1064–65 (noting the changes in criminal disenfranchisement in the 
late 1800s that led to the use of criminal disenfranchisement as a means of racial 
discrimination). 
 71 Bailey Figler, Note, A Vote for Democracy: Confronting the Racial Aspects of Felon 
Disenfranchisement, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 723, 729 (2006). 
 72 Id. at 728–29. 
 73 Ewald, supra note 57, at 1063–64. 
 74 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 29–30 (2010). 
 75 John Ghaelian, Restoring the Vote: Former Felons, International Law, and the Eighth 
Amendment, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 762–63 (2013) (“Southern states used 
disenfranchisement to deny African Americans the vote and as a means of curtailing the rights 
they had gained after the Civil War.”).  
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extremity of permissible action under the limitation of the Federal 
Constitution, with a view to the eliminating of every negro voter who can be 
gotten rid of, legally, without materially impairing the numerical strength of 
the white electorate.”76  Historical records indicate this was a common 
sentiment among the governing white power structure of the South in the 
post-Reconstruction era.77 
This behavior would continue, subject to only occasional restriction, until 
the passing of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.78  Nearly all of the many 
methods employed to promote segregation and discrimination during the 
Reconstruction Era and beyond have been declared unconstitutional or 
abandoned as indefensible.79  Only criminal disenfranchisement has the 
distinction of continued and persistent existence.80  
In the wake of Reconstruction, lawmakers began to write and amend 
criminal disenfranchisement statutes to specifically target crimes deemed 
more likely to be committed by blacks than whites.81  This rewriting of 
classifications in the criminal code was widespread in the South.  For 
example, in 1869, Mississippi had a constitutional provision disenfranchising 
those guilty of “any crime.”82  In 1890, this provision was limited to enforce 
disenfranchisement only those with convictions for specific crimes—crimes 
for which blacks were specifically targeted and more likely to be 
prosecuted.83  Numerous other examples convey that “between 1890 and 
1910, several Southern states altered their criminal disenfranchisement laws 
with the express intent of removing blacks from the rolls.”84  Georgia and 
Alabama, in 1877 and 1901 respectively, passed similar laws at state 
constitutional conventions permanently barring those convicted of a crime of 
“moral turpitude” from voting, regardless of whether that crime mandated 
                                                                                                                   
 76 The Heritage Museum, The Harrisonburg-Rockingham Experience: African-American 
Education During Segregation, http://www.heritagecenter.com/Web_Pages/Museum/Collecti 
on/blackedu/jimcrow.html.  
 77 Id.; see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (“[T]he Alabama 
Constitutional Convention of 1901 was part of a movement that swept the post-Reconstruction 
South to disenfranchise blacks.”). 
 78 See generally Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 
MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952). 
 79 Ewald, supra note 57, at 1122–27. 
 80 Id. at 1065–66, 1122–27. 
 81 Id. at 1090–91. 
 82 Id. at 1091. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id. 
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incarceration.85  Many misdemeanors became crimes of moral turpitude; 
particularly those crimes associated with the widespread dislocation of 
landless, newly freed African-Americans and with the socio-economic 
realities of being poor and marginalized in the post-Reconstruction American 
South.86  Though some linguistic subterfuge was involved, the intent and 
expectation of these laws was clear: discrimination on account of race would 
continue in the South and it would be pushed to the outermost, 
constitutionally permissible limits.   
Though the Southern power structure changed the language it used to 
effect discriminatory disenfranchisement out of constitutional necessity, 
lawmakers made little effort to conceal racial motivation.  Chief Justice 
Cooper, writing for the Mississippi Supreme Court in 1896, wrote:  
Within the field of permissible action under the limitations 
imposed by the federal constitution, the convention swept the 
circle of expedients to obstruct the exercise of the franchise by 
the negro race.  By reason of its previous condition of servitude 
and dependence, this race had acquired or accentuated certain 
peculiarities of habit, of temperament, and of character, which 
clearly distinguished it as a race from that of the whites, a 
patient, docile people, but careless, landless, and migratory 
within narrow limits, without forethought, and its criminal 
members given rather to furtive offenses than to the robust 
crimes of the whites.  Restrained by the federal constitution 
from discriminating against the negro race, the convention 
discriminated against its characteristics and the offenses to 
which its weaker members were prone.87 
In addition to this change regarding the underlying intent of criminal 
disenfranchisement statutes, the post-Civil War modification of criminal 
disenfranchisement laws also transformed the manner in which these laws 
were applied.88  Individual deliberation by the judiciary was largely 
eliminated.89  Instead, criminals were automatically disenfranchised upon 
                                                                                                                   
 85 Id. at 1094.  
 86 Id. at 1094–95. 
 87 Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 868 (Miss. 1896). 
 88 See Ewald, supra note 57, at 1062 (describing the differences between “colonial and 
contemporary criminal disenfranchisement”). 
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conviction—rendering mandated disenfranchisement separate from direct 
and individualized punitive sentencing.90  The effect of the change is hard to 
overstate.  The automatic and invisible nature of criminal disenfranchisement 
laws has significantly contributed to the number of people so disenfranchised 
and the inability of such disenfranchised persons to challenge the relevant 
laws under the protections afforded by the Constitution.91  Further, this 
automatic application is a residual effect of legal changes driven by racism 
and a want for political oppression.  Despite this history, criminal 
disenfranchisement laws continue to exist and operate in the United States.  
3.  The Current State of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States 
Although the explicit discriminatory intent of the post-Civil War era is 
gone, felon disenfranchisement remains pervasive, legal, and nearly 
unimpeachable.  Following the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, 
legislators amended felon disenfranchisement laws to remove any expression 
of discriminatory intent.92  Nonetheless, these policies of disenfranchisement 
continue to have a clearly disproportionate impact on racial minorities.93  As 
will be discussed further in Part IV, the automatic application of 
disenfranchisement resulting from criminal conviction is at the core of this 
disparity. 
There are numerous differences in the scope and structure of state 
disenfranchisement laws; most have withstood various challenges to their 
legality in the federal courts.94  Indeed, as will be discussed further, the 
                                                                                                                   
 90 Id. 
 91 See generally Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding that individuals with 
felony convictions can be barred from voting without violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiffs 
seeking to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws under the VRA based on a showing of 
racial discrimination within the criminal justice system must show intentional discrimination 
within the criminal justice system driving the enactment of a felon disenfranchisement 
statute). 
 92 See Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159, 171 n.64 (2001) 
(describing amendments to state criminal laws in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, and Virginia). 
 93 UGGEN, SHANNON & MANZA, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
 94 See Ghaelian, supra note 75, at 766–73 (discussing the common challenges to criminal 
disenfranchisement laws). 
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Supreme Court has rejected challenges made to felon disenfranchisement 
laws alleging an impermissibly discriminatory racial effect.95  
As of 2010, 5.85 million people were disenfranchised in the United States 
because of a felony conviction.96  Felon disenfranchisement accounts for 
2.5% of the voting age population—one in every forty adult American 
citizens.97  Six of the ten states with the highest percentage of 
disenfranchised felons are former Confederate states.98  Florida and 
Mississippi, the states with the highest felon disenfranchisement rates, 
disenfranchise 10.4% and 8.2% of their respective, otherwise voting eligible 
electorate.99 
There is considerable variety in the scope, structure, and severity of state 
felon disenfranchisement laws.  Forty-eight states provide for some form of 
felon disenfranchisement; only two states, Maine and Vermont, have no such 
voting restriction.100  Thirty-four states prohibit individuals on parole from 
voting; thirty of those states also deny voting access to individuals on 
probation.101  Twelve states ban felons from voting either permanently for 
particular offenses or for a specified time following the completion of their 
sentence (including probation or parole).102  
Spanning the inconsistent patchwork of felon disenfranchisement laws, 
there are two near-constants: (1) cumbersome, financially demanding, and 
time intensive restoration procedures for regaining the right to vote, and (2) 
rapid growth of those affected as a percentage of the otherwise eligible 
electorate.103  While most states eventually allow individuals to regain their 
right to vote, they must do so through a process that is often arduous and 
unclear, causing many ex-offenders to never restore their voting eligibility.104  
Some states additionally impose financial penalties on ex-offenders, making 
the restoration process “a bureaucratic maze [requiring] the payment of fines 
or court costs.”105  
                                                                                                                   
 95 Id. at 766–69 (discussing challenges to criminal disenfranchisement under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act). 
 96 UGGEN, SHANNON & MANZA, supra note 7, at 1. 
 97 Id.  
 98 Id. at 16 tbl.3. 
 99 Id.  
 100 Id. at 2, 3 tbl.1. 
 101 CHUNG, supra note 1, at 1 tbl.1. 
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 103 ALEXANDER, supra note 74, at 154–55; see also CHUNG, supra note 1, at 3 fig.B. 
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The character and construction of state felon disenfranchisement laws 
make for a varied and complex legal framework.  The ultimate outcome of 
this framework has neither quality—the results are clear.  Throughout the 
United States, in the decades concurrent with its “War on Drugs,” there has 
been a steady and dramatic rise in the number of people affected by felon 
disenfranchisement laws.106  An estimated 1.17 million people were 
disenfranchised because of felony convictions in 1976; by 2010, that number 
had more than quadrupled.107 
Although modern felon disenfranchisement law is clearly related to the 
explosive expansion of the criminal justice system in the late twentieth 
century, in the eyes of the federal courts these laws exist apart and distinct 
from the machinations of criminal law.108  This understanding has proved 
difficult for litigants to overcome in the federal courts.109  Particularly, this 
unique interpretive framework has made it difficult to challenge felon 
disenfranchisement either through traditional channels protecting minority 
voting rights or on the grounds of constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection under law.110 
4.  The Unique Nature of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in the United 
States 
The American policy regarding felony disenfranchisement stands in stark 
contrast to the like policies of European nations and other constitutional 
democracies across the world.  No European state has a blanket voting 
prohibition, for any duration, for convicted criminals who have fully served 
their sentence.111  Indeed, “[t]here are disagreements and debates within 
                                                                                                                   
 106 See CHUNG, supra note 1, at 3 fig.B (depicting the dramatic rise in the population of the 
disenfranchised population in the U.S. which corresponds to the years the U.S. effectuated its 
War on Drug policy). 
 107 UGGEN, SHANNON & MANZA, supra note 6, at 1.  
 108 Ewald, supra note 57, at 1057–58 (noting that federal courts view felon 
disenfranchisement as a “collateral consequence” of a criminal conviction rather than a 
criminal punishment). 
 109 Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of 
Debt, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349, 361–64 (2012) (discussing how felon disenfranchisement is 
not afforded the traditional fundamental rights/equal protection analysis that generally protect 
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 110 Id. at 362–64 (discussing the equal protection analysis of felon disenfranchisement 
applied in Richardson); Ghaelian, supra note 75, at 768–70 (discussing the common Voting 
Rights Act challenges to felon disenfranchisement). 
 111 ISPAHANI, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
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European nations over disenfranchisement – but the debate is which 
prisoners should be barred from voting.  In almost all cases, the debate stops 
at the prison walls.”112  The United States is alone amongst similarly free 
nations in its use of disenfranchisement laws where “disqualification is 
automatic, pursues no defined purpose, and affects millions.”113  Two 
influential, recent decisions from the European Court of Human Rights and 
the Canadian Supreme Court highlight this disparity. 
In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued its 
decision in Hirst v. United Kingdom (Hirst No. 2), affirming that “an 
absolute bar on voting by any serving prisoner in any circumstance” was an 
unlawful violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights.114  While the ECtHR recognized that nations have some 
discretion to limit prisoner voting in specific and limited circumstances, the 
court noted that “universal suffrage has become the basic principle.”115  The 
Hirst No. 2 opinion stressed that the United Kingdom could not provide a 
legitimate and proportional rationale for imposing an automatic and absolute 
voting ban on incarcerated individuals.116  The ECtHR made clear that “the 
ballot is a right, not a privilege, and that the presumption in democratic states 
must be in favor of inclusion.”117 
The Canadian Supreme Court, like the ECtHR, has also allowed some 
level of governmental discretion in restricting access to the ballot but has 
generally favored a basic presumption in support of robust voting rights.  In 
Suave v. Canada (Suave No. 2), the Canadian government argued that the 
Supreme Court of Canada should uphold a federal electoral law that 
disenfranchised prisoners serving sentences longer than two years.118  The 
Canadian government had expressly amended the law to be permissible 
under the notwithstanding clause in Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.119  In the Charter, the notwithstanding clause “allows 
certain fundamental rights to be limited by Parliament.”120  
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The Canadian Supreme Court struck down the amended electoral law.121 
The court ruled that the right to vote was of special importance and not 
subject to the provisions of the notwithstanding clause.122  Thus, for a 
restriction on the right to vote to be legitimate, the court held that the 
limitation must be “demonstrably justified,” according to Section 1 of the 
Charter.123  In short, to satisfy the demonstrable justification requirement, the 
government must prove that the aims of the law justified the voting right 
restriction.124  Instead, the court found there was: (1) not sufficient evidence 
of a rational connection between crime and punishment, (2) restriction of 
voting rights was not an effective educational tool, (3) disenfranchisement 
was inconsistent with the democratic rule of law, and (4) that, as punishment, 
disenfranchisement was arbitrary and excessively disproportionate in 
scope.125  On the irrationality of prisoner disenfranchisement, the Canadian 
Supreme Court wrote: “depriving at-risk individuals of their sense of 
collective identity and membership in the community is unlikely to instill a 
sense of responsibility and community identity, while the right to participate 
in voting helps teach democratic values and social responsibility.”126  
Finding all arguments provided by the state unsuccessful in defeating the 
presumption of unrestricted franchise, the court wrote: “Denying a citizen the 
right to vote denies the basis of democratic legitimacy . . . Denying prisoners 
the right to vote . . . removes a route to social development and 
rehabilitation . . . and it undermines the correctional law and policy directed 
toward rehabilitation and integration.”127 
It is important to note that in both these cases the issue was the voting 
rights of currently incarcerated prisoners.  For both courts, the idea of an 
automatic ban on voting for ex-offenders would presumably be an 
impermissible violation of electoral law, beyond the scope of reasonable 
debate.  This brief comparative analysis supports the notion that, in the realm 
of criminal disenfranchisement, the United States is an outlier among modern 
democratic nations. 
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B.  The Disparate Racial Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in the 
United States 
The scale of vote-denial permitted by felon disenfranchisement laws 
should be worrisome for the world’s oldest constitutional democracy.  
Further, the disparate effect these laws have on historically oppressed and 
marginalized racial minorities should be cause for immediate concern. 
Overwhelmingly, felon disenfranchisement laws disproportionately affect 
African-Americans.128  Over 2 million African-Americans are currently 
disenfranchised because of a felony conviction.129  This results in the 
disenfranchisement of 7.7% black adults otherwise eligible to vote, 
compared to the 1.8% criminal disfranchisement rate of the non-black 
population.130  These figures are national averages; in three states—Florida, 
Kentucky, and Virginia—more than one in five black adults are 
disenfranchised because of a felony conviction.131 
The numbers are even worse for black men.  Thirteen percent of the adult 
black male population, 1.4 million people, is disenfranchised because of a 
felony conviction.132  This is seven times the national average rate of 
criminal disenfranchisement.133  Research indicates that if the current 
incarceration rates remain steady, in the next generation, three out of every 
ten black men can expect to be disenfranchised during their lifetime.134  In 
states that disenfranchise ex-offenders, 40% of the adult black male 
population may permanently lose their voting rights.135  
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The disproportionate impact of felon disenfranchisement laws along 
racial lines is undeniable and pervasive.  This is true despite the fact that no 
standing state disenfranchisement law has any express racial element in 
either intent or form.136  It is impossible to view the phenomenon of felon 
disenfranchisement without considering the radical transformation of the 
criminal justice system in size, scope and, sentencing structure that has been 
enacted across partisan divides and presidential administrations over the past 
thirty-five years.137  The modern criminal justice system, like the felon 
disenfranchisement laws with which it is inherently intertwined, operates 
without explicit racial discrimination, and yet has an overwhelmingly 
disproportionate effect on the black population.138 
C.  Efforts to Challenge Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States 
Federal disenfranchisement laws are ubiquitous in the United States but 
they have not gone unchallenged.  Affected individuals, political policy 
groups, and a minority of nationally visible politicians have sought reform of 
felon disenfranchisement.  Several types of legal challenges have been 
brought against felon disenfranchisement laws in the United States.139  To 
date, these challenges have been largely unsuccessful.140  This section will 
explore the various channels claimants have used in the past to challenge 
felon disenfranchisement laws in the federal courts.  Specifically, this section 
will highlight challenges to criminal disenfranchisement provisions 
previously brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, and will examine the current relevant governing law in the 
several federal circuits.  
1.  Fourteenth Amendment Challenges 
The Fourteenth Amendment is perhaps the strongest constitutional source 
for contesting impermissibly discriminatory election laws.  Yet, ironically, 
challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws brought under the protections of 
                                                                                                                   
 136 See supra Part II.A.3 (describing the changes to disenfranchisement laws following the 
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the Fourteenth Amendment have been almost completely denied by modern 
rulings of the Supreme Court.141  
In Richardson v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court first encountered the issue of 
felon disenfranchisement and its constitutionality under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.142  The plaintiffs in Richardson, three individuals barred from 
voting because of previous convictions constituting “infamous crimes” under 
California’s Constitution, brought a class petition asserting that this restriction 
on suffrage was a violation of a fundamental right under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thereby subject to strict scrutiny 
analysis.143  Petitioners argued that the State of California must prove that it 
has a compelling state interest for the felon disenfranchisement provision if the 
provision was to withstand a test of constitutionality.144  Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority of the Court, dismissed this argument, reversing the 
prior decision by the California Supreme Court, and upheld the 
constitutionality of California’s expansive felon disenfranchisement 
provisions.145 
In a strident dissent, Justice Marshall urged that the Court follow the 
typical Equal Protection framework.146  Justice Marshall noted that a 
disparate classification of individuals regarding a fundamental right is 
necessarily subject to a tripartite analysis.147  According to this framework, 
when a fundamental right is restricted by the state, that state has the 
significant burden of proving that (1) the challenged law is necessary to a 
“legitimate and substantial state interest,” (2) the classification involved is 
precisely drawn, and (3) that “there are no other reasonable ways to achieve 
the State’s goal with a lesser burden on the constitutionally protected 
interest.”148  In Richardson, the majority never conducted this analysis.  
Instead, the Court held that the affirmative sanction of criminal 
                                                                                                                   
 141 See generally Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding individuals with 
felony convictions may be barred from voting without violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  But see Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating the criminal 
disenfranchisement provision of the Alabama Constitution as impermissible under the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection because evidence demonstrated it was enacted 
with a discriminatory purpose). 
 142 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
 143 Id. at 26–27, 54. 
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disenfranchisement in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment made the 
normal Equal Protection analysis unnecessary.149  
Justice Rehnquist provided an exhaustive legislative history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to support the Court’s reasoning that:  
[T]he understanding of those who adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as reflected in the express language of Sec. 2 and 
in the historical and judicial interpretation of the Amendment’s 
applicability to state laws disenfranchising felons, 
[distinguishes] such laws from those other state limitations on 
the franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal 
Protection Clause by this Court.150 
The Court thereby found explicit congressional approval of felon 
disenfranchisement and held it unnecessary for the state to carry the burden 
of typical Equal Protection analysis.151  Always the unbending advocate for a 
more fully realized and consistently applicable American equality, Justice 
Marshall ardently disagreed, writing: “The ballot is the democratic system’s 
coin of the realm.  To condition its exercise on support of the established 
order is to debase the currency beyond recognition.”152 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Richardson has prevented Fourteenth 
Amendment challenges to state felon disenfranchisement laws in all 
instances except those involving a clear demonstration that the law was 
enacted with an impermissibly racially discriminatory intent.  In Hunter v. 
Underwood, the Supreme Court held, for the first—and only—time, that a 
state felon disenfranchisement law was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.153  In Hunter, the petitioners alleged that a criminal 
disenfranchisement provision in the Alabama Constitution was enacted with 
a racially discriminatory purpose and that it had such an impact.154  The 
Court held that the law was facially race neutral and that therefore a racially 
discriminatory purpose and intent must be proven to establish a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause.155  The burden of proof rested on a two-part test 
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requiring (1) the challengers show that racial discrimination was a 
“substantial or motivating factor” in the legislature’s choice to disenfranchise 
criminals and, if this is established, (2) the state to prove that the provision 
would have been enacted in the absence of any racially discriminatory 
motive.156  
After review of the historical record of Alabama’s Constitutional 
Convention, including the rare smoking gun of an intact legislative record 
detailing the rampant racially discriminatory animus behind the provision, the 
Court held that the legislative record indicated the intent necessary to render 
the provision unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.157  Despite 
the positive result for the petitioners in Hunter, the case does little to improve a 
prospective claimant’s ability to challenge felon disenfranchisement under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Indeed, the combination of the Richardson 
endorsement of the “affirmative sanction” of felon disenfranchisement found 
in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment158 and the Hunter requirement of 
intentional discrimination has created a significant impediment for litigants 
attempting to challenge the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement 
provisions. 
2.  Previous Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement under the Voting 
Rights Act 
The roadblocks to litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment have led 
recent challengers of felon disenfranchisement laws to pursue claims under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).  Section 2 provides:  
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State 
or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to 
vote on account of race or color.159 
A key fact distinguishing claims made under Section 2 of the VRA is that, 
unlike Fourteenth Amendment claims, “proof of discriminatory intent is not 
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required to establish a violation of Section 2.”160  This lesser burden was 
made explicit by the amendments to the VRA passed by Congress in 1982 
and has subsequently been affirmed by the Supreme Court.161  
As mandated by Congress, to successfully challenge a felon 
disenfranchisement provision under Section 2, a plaintiff must establish (1) 
that Section 2 is applicable and allows a challenge to felon 
disenfranchisement, and (2) felon disenfranchisement “results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color.”162  The key hurdle for litigants pursuing a Section 
2 claim is the threshold of applicability of the VRA to felon 
disenfranchisement provisions.  There is currently a significant circuit split 
arising from this first threshold requirement.163 
The Eleventh Circuit, in Johnson v. Governor, rejected the plaintiffs’ 
claim that Section 2 of the VRA permitted challenges to felon 
disenfranchisement laws.164  The plaintiffs in Johnson, convicted felons who 
had fully served their prison sentences, sought to overturn Florida’s felon 
disenfranchisement provisions under both the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Section 2 of the VRA.165  The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Fourteenth 
Amendment claim based on the Supreme Court precedent of Richardson v. 
Ramirez.166  Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit held that Section 2 could not be 
applicable because it would create a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment 
and its affirmative sanction of criminal disenfranchisement.167  The Johnson 
court held that Section 2 could only be a proper channel to challenge felon 
disenfranchisement laws if there was “a clear statement from Congress 
endorsing [that] understanding.”168  Finding no such statement—and weary 
of Congress potentially exceeding its enforcement powers under the 
Fourteenth Amendment in passing the VRA, if the Act was indeed applicable 
                                                                                                                   
 160 S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179. 
 161 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (holding proof of discriminatory intent 
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to felon disenfranchisement laws—the Eleventh Circuit rejected the 
petitioners’ claims.169  
The Second Circuit soon encountered the same issue in Hayden v. 
Pataki.170  The plaintiffs in Hayden sought to overturn New York’s felon 
disenfranchisement statute under the VRA; their claim was rejected.171  The 
court, like the Eleventh Circuit, performed a thorough statutory analysis of 
the VRA in deciding its applicability to the felon disenfranchisement 
statute.172  The court concluded that if read out of context, the plain language 
of the VRA could be read to include felon disenfranchisement provisions.173  
Thus, given the context of history and congressional intent, the court held 
that felon disenfranchisement statutes are presumptively constitutional, citing 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s “explicit approval.”174  The Second Circuit, 
like the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson, emphasized the clear statement rule, 
holding that unless a statement from Congress made it unmistakably clear 
that it intended to alter the federal balance (by indirectly adjusting the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment), Congress did not intend the VRA 
to apply to felon disenfranchisement laws.175  The only door left open by the 
Hayden Court to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws was the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the corresponding proof of intentional discrimination, per 
Hunter. 
Three years later, in Simmons v. Galvin, the First Circuit issued a nearly 
identical holding—in both analysis and result—as found in Hayden.176  In 
Simmons, the court held that felon disenfranchisement provisions are 
                                                                                                                   
 169 Id. at 1234–35.  Notably, the court offered the following in the penultimate paragraph of 
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Several amici curiae argue that, as a policy matter, felons should be 
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presumptively constitutional, but that the VRA’s broad and ambiguous 
language allows and encourages judicial inquiry beyond the text.177  After 
reviewing the legislative history of the VRA, the 1982 amendments, and 
post-1982 Congressional action, the First Circuit held that “Congress has 
excepted from the reach of the VRA protections from vote denial for claims 
against a state which disenfranchises incarcerated felons.”178  The three 
decisions above from the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits all found the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s “affirmative 
sanction” on criminal disenfranchisement to preclude applicability of similar 
claims under the VRA; the Ninth Circuit, however, did not. 
3.  The Ninth Circuit Changes the Game (And Then Changes Its Mind) 
The Farrakhan cases from the Ninth Circuit currently constitute the most 
successful challenges made to felon disenfranchisement statutes under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  The Farrakhan line of cases began with 
a challenge made to Washington’s felon disenfranchisement statute by 
several minority citizens denied the right to vote on account of previous 
felony convictions.179  The core of the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged, 
“minorities are disproportionately prosecuted and sentenced, resulting in 
their disproportionate representation among the persons disenfranchised 
under the Washington Constitution.”180  To support this allegation, the 
plaintiffs offered an abundance of factual evidence, citing studies indicating 
that African-Americans were nine times more likely to be incarcerated 
despite a 3.72:1 arrest ratio of African-Americans to whites, and 70% more 
likely to be searched.181  Despite the strong factual record presented, the 
district court granted summary judgment to the state and held that the 
plaintiffs’ evidence was legally insufficient because it involved 
discrimination in the criminal justice system only, not discrimination within 
the felon disenfranchisement provision itself.182  Importantly, the district 
court held that while the evidence was insufficient, challenges to felon 
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disenfranchisement provisions were indeed cognizable under Section 2 of the 
VRA.183 
On appeal, in Farrakhan I, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
finding that challenges to felon disenfranchisement provisions were 
cognizable under Section 2,184 but ultimately reversed and remanded the case 
back to the district court.185 Importantly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court as to the sufficiency of the evidence claim, holding evidence of 
discrimination in the criminal justice system relevant under the “totality of 
the circumstances” analysis required by Section 2.186  To support this view, 
the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the nine factors included in a Senate 
Report issued with the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act—
specifically factor 5, which advised consideration of the “social and 
historical conditions” related to a law being challenged and analyzed under 
the VRA.187  On remand, the district court found that plaintiffs’ evidence 
regarding discrimination within the criminal justice system was “admissible, 
relevant, and persuasive,”188 but nevertheless held that a totality of the 
circumstances analysis, including an analysis of the nine Senate Report 
factors, did not support the claim that Washington’s felon 
disenfranchisement provision resulted in discrimination within the “electoral 
process on account of race.”189  The district court therefore affirmed its 
earlier ruling and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.190 
The case was again heard on appeal before the Ninth Circuit,191 this time 
in the wake of sister circuit decisions denying the applicability of the VRA 
felon disenfranchisement provisions.  Nonetheless, in Farrakhan II, the 
Ninth Circuit found no reason to overturn its holding in Farrakhan I that 
felon disenfranchisement provisions were cognizable under the VRA.192  
Indeed, the court—rather remarkably in the face of the holdings of its sister 
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circuits—went farther.  In Farrakhan II, the court held that compelling, 
direct evidence within the bounds of a single Senate Report factor could be 
enough, in some instances, to be controlling in a totality of the circumstances 
analysis.193  The court thereby re-examined the extensive factual record of 
the lower court and held the plaintiffs had met their burden of proof—
Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law stood in violation of the Voting 
Rights Act and constituted racially discriminatory vote denial.194  
The rather momentous holding in Farrakhan II, the first decision in the 
country of its kind,195 did not remain good law in the Ninth Circuit for long.  
Just a few months later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the case 
to be reheard en banc.196  In Farrakhan III, a per curiam opinion, the Ninth 
Circuit altered its previous holding on the relationship between felon 
disenfranchisement provisions and the VRA.197  The en banc court 
acknowledged the significantly different views taken by the First, Second, 
and Eleventh Circuits, and also recognized the long history of felon 
disenfranchisement laws in the United States.198  In recognition of these 
decisions and in deference to the underlying rationale, the court in 
Farrakhan III held that their previous decision had “swe[pt] too broadly” and 
could not stand.199  From here, the Ninth Circuit did something unusual: 
referencing McCleskey v. Kemp200 and Hunter v. Underwood,201 both cases 
involving Fourteenth Amendment claims, the court held that plaintiffs 
seeking to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws under the VRA based on 
a showing of racial discrimination within the criminal justice system must 
show intentional discrimination driving the enactment of a felon 
disenfranchisement statute.202  The court then held that the plaintiffs failed to 
carry the burden of evidence, and affirmed the summary judgment awarded 
to the defendants by the district court.203  
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Notably, Farrakhan III did not overturn the Ninth Circuit’s prior rulings 
holding Section 2 of the VRA applicable to felon disenfranchisement 
provisions.  For this reason, the circuits remain split.  Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari on this issue.204 
III.  BACKGROUND [SOUTH AFRICA] 
Suffrage in post-Apartheid South Africa is considered a fundamental right 
and any attempt to limit the suffrage of citizens must pass a strict test of 
constitutionality.205  To facilitate a proper comparison between criminal 
disenfranchisement in the United States and South Africa, it is necessary to 
consider the history, purpose, and content of the new South African 
Constitution of 1996, and how it is interpreted by the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa.  Secondly, this section will examine decisions made by the 
Constitutional Court in two landmark cases concerning the voting rights of 
prisoners.  The United States can learn from the example of South Africa. 
A.  History, Content, and Structure of the South African Constitution  
The current South African Constitution emerged out of a period of 
political transformation marked by a transition from the National Party 
controlled Apartheid era to the sweeping electoral victories of Nelson 
Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994.206  In the late 
1980s, back channel negotiations took place between the leaders of both the 
National Party and the ANC to either draft a Bill of Rights to the 
Constitution or draft of a wholly new constitutional document.207  A major 
breakthrough occurred in 1990, when the ruling South African government 
freed political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, and lifted the ban on 
adverse political parties.208  Sensing the weakness of the National Party and 
the environment of potentially transformative change, numerous interested 
groups including the ANC, the National Party, the South African Law 
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Commission, the Inkatha Freedom Party, and a group of liberal academics, 
submitted draft constitutions.209 
With the backdrop of change, caution, and spurts of violence, the Multi-
Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) officially began in 1993 in 
Johannesburg.210  A system of working groups, including a Negotiating 
Council and a series of Technical Committees, were informed by the 
opinions of party leaders, political activists, legal scholars, and constitutional 
experts from around the world.211  After the 1994 elections, a Constitutional 
Assembly consisting of members from the new, democratically elected 
National Assembly and Senate began working on the final Constitution;212 
the Assembly eventually “reached a compromise on the final draft, now the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, in 1996, after over two years of 
debate.”213 
The South Africa Parliament asserts that its constitution “lays the 
foundation for an open society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights.”214  As with the U.S. Constitution, the South 
African Constitution is considered the supreme law of the land; its provisions 
must be followed by everyone, including the government.215  Notably, the 
South African Constitution was created in direct response to the need for 
radical change and new levels of equality in South Africa.  The South 
African government asserts  
[b]efore its transition to a democratic, constitutional state, 
South Africa was known as a country in which the rights and 
freedoms of the majority of people were denied.  To prevent 
this from ever happening again, our Constitution contains a Bill 
of Rights which can only be changed if two thirds of the 
members of the National Assembly and six of the nine 
provinces in the National Council of Provinces agree to such a 
change.216 
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The South African Constitution diverges from the U.S. Constitution in 
that it goes significantly further in its bestowing of enumerated constitutional 
rights.217  Both countries assure the protection of speech, suffrage, 
association, political assembly, religious preference, and other well-
established democratic rights.218  The South African Bill of Rights, however, 
has a broader conception of equality than its American counterpart.219  The 
South African Bill of Rights prohibits discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, sanctions affirmative action, protects labor rights and the ability 
to unionize, and guarantees human dignity as a fundamental right.220  The 
South African Constitution also endows citizens with so-called “second and 
third-generation rights,” including socioeconomic provisions establishing the 
right to education, health care, housing; and solidarity rights, including the 
right to a clean environment and cultural membership.221 
Finally, two practical points are important to mention in a comparative 
legal analysis involving South African Constitutional law.  First, unlike the 
U.S. Constitution, the South African Constitution provides explicit 
interpretive instructions within its own text.222  There is no battle in South 
African judicial thought directly analogous to the debate between 
conservative originalism and the progressive view of a living, dynamic 
constitution as found in the United States; instead, there is explicit 
direction.223  For example, Section 39 of the South African Constitution 
provides: 
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum — 
  a. must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom; 
  b. must consider international law; and 
  c. may consider foreign law.224 
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This Section effectively mandates that South Africa engage with its 
constitution in a progressive manner, largely foreign to the American judicial 
process of constitutional interpretation.225  This provision has contributed to 
the Constitutional Court undertaking “a more communitarian and dignity-
oriented approach unlike the individualistic and liberty-oriented U.S. 
Supreme Court.”226 
A second major doctrinal difference in the South African Constitution is 
found in Section 36, which provides: 
1. The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in 
terms of law of general application to the extent that 
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors, including — 
a. the nature of the right;  
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
c. the nature and extent of the limitation;  
d. the relation between the limitation and its 
purpose; and 
e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
2. Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other 
provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any 
right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.227  
The framework articulated in Section 36 of the South African 
Constitution is nearly identical to the tripartite analysis advocated for by 
Justice Marshall.228  Indeed, the idea of some restriction on fundamental 
rights is inherent in any ordered, democratic society.  It is intuitive that at 
some point individual rights must bow to the common good and protection of 
others in society at large.  This explicit limitation clause in Section 36 of the 
South African Constitution finds several other close analogues in the 
numerous constitutional tests that have been developed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Again, as with the interpretive instructions of Section 39, the primary 
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difference in the limiting provision employed by the South African 
Constitutional Court is that the necessary judicial calculus regarding the 
limitation of fundamental rights is explicitly described in the South African 
Constitution.229  Both Sections 36 and 39 of the South African Constitution 
are integral to the analysis of criminal disenfranchisement in South Africa, 
and to the broader notion of what the United States can learn from that 
country’s constitutional process.  
B.  The Constitutional Court of South Africa 
The Constitutional Court is South Africa’s highest court for cases that 
involve questions and issues involving the application and interpretation of 
the South African Constitution.230  Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
has a broader grant of substantive jurisdiction, the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa has jurisdiction only on issues related to the provisions of the 
South African Constitution.231  
Given the inherently progressive tendencies in the South African 
Constitution outlined above, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
has been noteworthy in its pragmatism and exercise of judicial restraint.232  
Reflecting pragmatic concerns over the danger of heavy-handed political 
instruction and a want for institutional integrity, the South African 
Constitutional Court has often sidestepped some of the most potentially 
controversial constitutional issues by limiting the scope of their opinions, at 
times in an effort to avoid strictly defining bright lines regarding the outer 
limits of free speech and religious expression.233  
Although there are differences, both substantively and procedurally, 
between the Constitutional Court of South Africa and the U.S. Supreme 
Court, there are significant similarities in the judicial process and 
authoritative source of law used by both courts that make a comparison 
valuable and potentially instructive. 
                                                                                                                   
 229 KENDE, supra note 19, at 9–10. 
 230 About the Court: Role of the Constitutional Court, CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF S. AFR., 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/thecourt/role.htm. 
 231 Id. 
 232 KENDE, supra note 19, at 10. 
 233 See, e.g., Christian Educ. South Africa v. Minister of Educ. 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) (S. 
Afr.) (choosing not to decide an underlying religious issue in a case involving a religious 
school’s right to discipline students); Case v. Minister of Safety 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) (S. 
Afr.) (declining to define the criteria for obesity). 
438 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 44:401 
 
 
C.  Transformative Constitutionalism 
From its earliest stages, the South African Constitution was explicitly 
written to be socially transformative.234  It is not just its design but also its 
ongoing implementation that is meant to achieve this end.235  Chief Justice 
Pius Langa has stated that “[i]t is clear that the notion of transformation has 
played and will play a vital role in interpreting the Constitution.”236 
Chief Justice Langa has identified the Epilogue of the Interim 
Constitution of South Africa as providing perhaps the greatest source for 
defining transformative constitutionalism.237  The Epilogue provides that the 
South African Constitution serve as a “historic bridge between the past of a 
deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and 
injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, 
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all 
South Africans, irrespective of color, race, class, belief or sex.”238  Indeed, 
the Chief Justice has stated that the central idea of transformative 
constitutionalism is that “we must change,” and that the constitution’s 
purpose should be “to heal the wounds of the past and guide us to a better 
future.”239 
Chief Justice Langa notes that one of the fundamental characteristics of 
the new rule of law in South Africa is that the constitution now demands all 
decisions “be capable of being substantively defended in terms of the rights 
and values [the constitution] enshrines.”240  The importance of this 
characteristic is tremendous for a nation previously defined by a dearth of 
legislative accountability and a system of law that was often arbitrary, 
commonly capricious or, at times, outright evil.241   
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Notably, this view of transformative constitutionalism is not confined to 
the period of transition in South Africa from Apartheid, nor will it be 
satisfied when all South Africans enjoy equal rights and access to services 
and resources.  Chief Justice Langa explains: 
Transformation is a permanent ideal, a way of looking at the 
world that creates a space in which dialogue and contestation 
are truly possible, in which new ways of being are constantly 
explored and created, accepted and rejected and in which 
change is unpredictable but the idea of change is constant.  
This is perhaps the ultimate vision of a transformative, rather 
than a transitional constitution.  This is a perspective that sees 
the Constitution as not transformative because of its peculiar 
historical position or its particular socio-economic goals but 
because it envisions a society that will always be open to 
change and contestation, a society that will always be defined 
by transformation.242 
The idea of ready adaptation and transformation central to the South 
African constitutional construct can be seen throughout the jurisprudence of 
the South African Constitutional Court.  The case law concerning criminal 
disenfranchisement, discussed below, is demonstrative of the ongoing 
implementation of this transformative ideal.  
D.  Criminal Franchise in South Africa: August and NICRO 
In both August and NICRO,243 the two landmark Constitutional Court 
cases supporting prisoners’ rights to vote, the judicial decision making 
process concerned the justification for and legitimacy of government 
legislation and action against the positive right of universal suffrage 
established in Section 19(3) of the South African Constitution.244  Notably, 
these decisions involved a prisoner’s right to vote.  No attempt has been 
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made by the South African government to disenfranchise individuals no 
longer incarcerated.  
August was the first of these seminal cases and constituted a relatively 
confined judicial decision.245  August did not affirmatively answer the 
question of whether it would be constitutional for the legislature to 
affirmatively limit a prisoner’s right to vote in a national election.246  NICRO 
was decided after the Election Act was amended in the wake of August.247  
NICRO ultimately invalidated these amendments, going further than August 
and emerging as the stronger doctrinal case.248  Both cases are important in 
their own right and this subsection will examine each in turn.  
Just prior to the National Parliamentary elections in 1999, a group of 
prisoners lobbied the Electoral Commission for an affirmative declaration 
that prisoners would be allowed to vote in the upcoming election.249  The 
governing piece of legislation, the Electoral Act of 1998, did not expressly 
prohibit or limit suffrage for the incarcerated at the time.250  The Electoral 
Commission’s policy, however, was not supportive of prisoner voting rights 
and took no affirmative action to provide prisoners with the capability to 
participate in elections.251  Challengers alleged this policy served to restrict 
their right to vote, a fundamental right, and the issue soon came before the 
Constitutional Court.252 
The Electoral Commission argued to the Constitutional Court that its 
inaction alone had done nothing to positively disenfranchise prisoners.253  
Further, the Commission argued that it was a situation created by the 
prisoners themselves that resulted in the loss of franchise rather than a failure 
of an obligation held by the Electoral Commission.254  The Commission 
argued it did not have a positive responsibility to seek out registration and 
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provide ballot access to prisoners; such an imposition of responsibility would 
be too costly.255 
The Constitutional Court rejected each of the Commission’s arguments.256  
The court found that the Electoral Commission had an obligation to citizens 
to provide for “the secrecy of the ballot and the machinery established for 
managing the [voting] process.”257  The court further held that the Electoral 
Commission did not have the statutory or constitutional authority to only 
provide a “system of registration and voting which would effectively 
disenfranchise all prisoners”; doing so was a violation of the Commission’s 
“obligation to take reasonable steps to create the opportunity to enable 
eligible prisoners to register and vote.”258  The court also rejected the 
government’s pragmatic arguments involving cost, and dismissed the notion 
that incarceration alone sufficed as a constitutionally adequate prohibition on 
voting.259  
In August, the Constitutional Court did not expressly grant franchise to 
prisoners or declare an affirmative legislative disenfranchisement of 
prisoners unconstitutional, but the tone of the opinion strongly suggested the 
future likelihood of a more expansive decision.  The court wrote:  
The achievement of the franchise has historically been 
important both for the acquisition of the rights of full and 
effective citizenship by all South Africans regardless of race, 
and for the accomplishment of an all-embracing 
nationhood . . . The vote of each and every citizen is a badge of 
dignity and of personhood. Quite literally, it says that 
everybody counts.260 
In response to the August decision, the South African Parliament 
amended the Electoral Act in 2003.261  The relevant part of the legislation 
curtailed the rights of prisoners to vote in two ways.  First, the Act stated that 
prisoners who were serving a “sentence of imprisonment without the option 
of a fine” were prohibited from voting.262  Second, the Act prohibited 
                                                                                                                   
 255 Id. para. 13. 
 256 Id. paras. 21–22, 28. 
 257 Id. para. 16. 
 258 Id. para. 22. 
 259 Id. paras. 18, 28, 30. 
 260 Id. at 23 para. 17. 
 261 ISPAHANI, supra note 2, at 14.  
 262 Id. at 14–15. 
442 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 44:401 
 
 
prisoners serving such a sentence from registering to vote while in prison, 
thus leaving open the possibility that a prisoner could be released and still 
disenfranchised if the voter roll had already been closed.263  In the wake of 
August, it was predictable that the constitutionality of these amendments 
would soon be challenged.  
In Minister of Home Affairs v. National Institute for Crime Prevention 
(NICRO), the Constitutional Court duly took up the issue.264  In NICRO, the 
government altered its legal argument, and squarely identified the South 
African Constitution’s Section 36 limiting provision as providing a 
constitutionally legitimate allowance for this legislation.265 
The Department of Home Affairs made three primary points in arguing 
for the limitation on the right to vote.  First, the government made an 
argument based on cost: it would be too complicated and expensive to 
provide the necessary apparatus for voting in prisons.266  Secondly, the 
government drew a comparison between prisoners and other people who may 
have difficulty getting to polling stations by arguing it would be inadvisable 
and illegitimate to favor prisoners over lawful citizens to the extent that 
immediate access to readily available polling stations would be afforded to 
prisoners and not all citizens.267  Finally, and apparently most distasteful to 
the court, was the government’s argument that it had a legitimate right to 
prohibit prisoners from voting so as to denounce crime and uphold the ideals 
of lawfulness.268  
A majority of the Constitutional Court ultimately disagreed with all of 
these arguments and held the relevant law invalid.269  Central to the court’s 
decision was an examination of means and ends.  The court proceeded 
through the government’s arguments in an attempt to prove or disprove a 
legitimate connection between the limitation of voting rights and an adequate 
government interest.270  Against this backdrop was also the court’s 
understanding that “[i]n the light of our history where denial of the right to 
vote was used to entrench white supremacy and to marginalise the great 
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majority of the people of our country, [the right to vote] is for us a precious 
right which must be vigilantly respected and protected.”271 
In reaching its decision the court first reiterated its holding in August that 
the government has a positive obligation, in any circumstance, to provide its 
citizens with the machinery necessary to participate in the voting process.272  
For these reasons, the court held that any argument involving cost must be 
dismissed, writing “[t]here is nothing to suggest that expanding [voting] 
arrangements to include prisoners sentenced without the option of a fine will 
in fact place an undue burden on the resources of the Commission.”273  The 
government’s argument involving the favoring of prisoners over lawful 
citizens was also quickly rejected as illogical.274 
The Constitutional Court then reached the more fundamental question of 
whether a rational connection existed between voting prohibition for 
prisoners and the government’s interest in regulating and preventing crime.  
In analyzing this question, the court drew heavily from the Canadian 
Supreme Court case Suavé No. 2.275  In Suavé No. 2, the Canadian Supreme 
Court held that the government had failed to establish a rational connection 
between legislation prohibiting prisoners from voting and the government 
interest in regulating unlawful conduct and providing appropriate 
punishment.276  The NICRO court endorsed Suavé, quoting its holding that “a 
government that restricts the franchise to a select portion of citizens is a 
government that weakens its ability to function as the legitimate 
representative of the excluded citizens, jeopardises its claims to 
representative democracy, and erodes the basis of its right to convict and 
punish lawbreakers.”277 
Ultimately, the court held that a blanket ban on the right of prisoners to 
vote was unconstitutional, and that the government failed to establish 
evidence sufficient to show there was an adequate interest in 
disenfranchisement.278  In addition, the court found the government’s 
arguments regarding public perception of crime and punishment to be 
particularly distasteful.279  In response to the notion that allowing prisoners to 
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vote might result in an appearance of the government being soft on crime, 
the court held the government may not “disenfranchise prisoners in order to 
enhance its image” or to “correct a public misconception as to its true 
attitude to crime and criminals.”280 
While not completely closing the door to voting limitations for some 
prisoners, NICRO firmly established an exceptionally high bar the 
government would have to pass if it wished to restrict access to the ballot.  
Thus, the universal suffrage provision of the South African Constitution has 
held firm when confronted with attempts to limit the criminal franchise.  
IV.  ANALYSIS 
This Note begins with the premise that a shared history of racial 
oppression links the United States and South Africa.  In both countries, there 
is the shared legacy of racial discrimination being afforded legitimacy and 
means for effectuation through legal mechanisms.  In both countries, racism 
was once rule of law.  It is in this harsh light of history that this Note asserts 
the United States should follow the South African approach to the 
constitutional analysis of criminal disenfranchisement.  Ideally, the United 
States would guarantee suffrage for nearly all citizens, incarcerated or 
otherwise.  For now, it would be a significant, and vital, improvement to 
restore the right to vote to those currently disenfranchised because of prior 
criminal convictions.  After exploring the common history of the United 
States and South Africa, this Section will propose lessons that may be 
learned from the South African notion of transformative constitutionalism.  
Additionally, this Section will demonstrate how U.S. federal courts should 
address criminal disenfranchisement in the future, both within the current 
framework and with an unblinking eye in regard to the shared experience of 
racial oppression and the accompanying institutional machinations that 
continue to effect citizens in both the United States and South Africa. 
A.  A Shared History of Racial Discrimination 
The institutionalized racism of the recent past is a mark of disgrace on 
both the United States and South Africa.  Historical error is a difficult issue 
to contend with, especially when citizens and politicians still grapple with 
that error’s residual effects.  This reality can often make thorough and open-
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minded discussion of race difficult, particularly in the United States.  For this 
reason, it can be useful to consider the experience of other countries, 
countries similarly situated but lacking the emotional resonance regarding 
similar matters of domestic debate.  This Note argues that the United States 
and South Africa share enough common history to allow the debate on felon 
disenfranchisement in the United States to become more robust by 
examining both how and why South Africa has decided issues involving the 
voting rights of prisoners. 
Among the most glaring images of Apartheid was the physical separation 
of races that existed in all aspects of life in South Africa and was positively 
mandated by law.  Until 1954, such de jure racial segregation was common 
throughout much of the United States, particularly in the American South.281  
Beyond mere separation, both countries implemented systems designed to 
uphold the oppressive status quo.  In the pre-Civil Rights era, state-imposed 
voting restrictions effectively disenfranchised large numbers of African- 
Americans by imposing literacy tests, poll taxes, and moral character tests 
that served to prevent African-Americans from accessing the ballot.282  South 
Africa similarly employed a number of legislative methods to either limit the 
influence of—or outright disenfranchise—the minority electorate.283 
Transformative legislation was first passed during the period of democratic 
transition in South Africa.  After reforming the voting process, in 1994 South 
Africa was able to hold open democratic elections for the first time in its 
history.284  It was only thirty years prior that the United States had sought to 
end racial discrimination in the voting process by passing the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965. 
Many scholars have written important works on the subject of 
institutionalized racism in the United States and South Africa.  It is an 
important subject, now more than ever.  Although the explicit, external shell 
of discrimination is gone, the legacy and effect of the errors of the past 
continue to exist.  Much more should be written about this latter topic, 
particularly given its great importance for the ongoing health of a modern 
democracy.  For the purposes of this Note, it is enough to recognize there is 
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sufficient similarity between the systems, and legacies, of racial oppression 
employed by the United States and South Africa so that a comparative 
analysis is useful and instinctive. 
B.  Transformative Constitutionalism, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the 
Weight and Influence of History 
In seeking to define transformative constitutionalism, Chief Justice Pius 
Langa has stated: 
Transformation is a permanent ideal, a way of looking at the 
world that creates a space in which dialogue and contestation 
are truly possible, in which new ways of being are constantly 
explored and created, accepted and rejected and in which 
change is unpredictable but the idea of change is constant.285  
It is clear why this notion of change was so integral to the South African 
experience.  The National Party-dominated status quo was deeply entrenched 
in South African society for decades.  The political elite used this 
entrenchment to further dominate and control those populations it chose to 
subjugate.  It was an unbending and unbroken cycle of oppression.  With this 
recent history, the ability to have a venue for principled and well-reasoned 
debates on legislative and constitutional change continues to be central to 
South Africa.  This necessity for and protection of change is at the core of 
the idea of transformative constitutionalism.  
The United States could stand to learn from the sanctity of the notion of 
change in South Africa.  One of the primary grounds cited by U.S. federal 
courts to prevent legal challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws is the 
affirmative sanction for some form of these laws found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.286  The Fourteenth Amendment allows the government to 
restrict the right to vote for those who “participat[e] in rebellion, or other 
crime.”287  This language alone has been used by several federal courts to 
uphold the validity of the sprawling, discriminatory patchwork of felon 
disenfranchisement laws within the United States.288  There is conflicting 
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analysis on the importance and relevance of this provision at the time the 
Fourteenth Amendment was drafted.289  It appears likely that it was 
specifically targeted at protecting against rebellious movements within the 
former Confederacy, and thus does not stand for the proposition of broad 
support for criminal disenfranchisement.290  Further, analysis of the intent of 
key drafters and architects of the Fourteenth Amendment provides strong 
support for the notion that the drafters would find its current role as an 
impediment to challenges of discriminatory criminal disenfranchisement 
provisions to be morally and constitutionally repugnant.291 
In any event, the example in South Africa suggests that it is inapposite to 
rely blindly on the strict language of a constitutional amendment that was 
passed in 1868 and has been subject to subsequent revisionist interpretation 
by both legislation and judicial decision.  It is unlikely that the drafters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment could have foreseen that those six words would 
allow the disenfranchisement of over 7% of the African American 
population.292   
Putting aside the notion of drafting intentions and accepting for argument 
that there is a deep history of disenfranchising convicted criminals in the 
United States, there is still much to absorb from the South African example 
and its approach to history inherent within transformative constitutionalism.  
The drafters of the South African Constitution recognized it was necessary to 
carefully but authoritatively handle the weight of the past, and to 
affirmatively provide for the rights of those previously discriminated against.  
Similarly, the United States should not block legal avenues for questioning 
the history of racial subjugation or for contesting modern remnants thereof.  
These are important questions.  Our society, with help if necessary from the 
judicial process, needs to have these debates.  Although reform of the 
criminal justice system may be the larger issue, the disproportionate effect of 
felon disenfranchisement on racial minorities should be a major point of 
concern for the United States. 
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C.  A New Vision of Felon Disenfranchisement Reform in the Federal Courts 
of the United States 
As discussed above, an embracement of the ideals of transformative 
constitutionalism, particularly in the realm of legislation that retains the 
unavoidable residue of a shameful history, would work significantly to help 
change the status quo of criminal disenfranchisement in the United States.  
This is not a wholly foreign concept.  Although the issue is subject to 
persistent and zealous debate, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court 
consistently indicates their opinion, at least implicitly, of the Constitution as 
a document capable of change and growth.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
needs reassessment, particularly the so-called “affirmative allowance” 
regarding criminal disenfranchisement.  No law that disenfranchises such a 
staggering proportion of the electorate should be considered unimpeachably 
constitutionally valid in the United States.  
Even if the Fourteenth Amendment restriction is taken at face value, U.S. 
federal courts could learn from the more explicit limitation clause analysis 
the South African Constitutional Court employs when deciding on issues 
involving restrictions of fundamental rights.  The Constitutional Court has 
held the essential proportionality analysis at the heart of the Section 36 
limitation clause is “one of degree to be assessed in the concrete legislative 
and social setting of the measure, paying due regard to the means which are 
realistically available in our country at this stage, but without losing sight of 
the ultimate values to be protected.”293  
In the United States, proportionality is not part of the constitutional 
equation regarding criminal disenfranchisement.  No state government has 
yet been forced to provide a detailed factual record of the governmental 
interest in, or the purpose of, felon disenfranchisement laws.  So far, courts 
have held the affirmative sanction of the Fourteenth Amendment alone 
provides sufficient constitutional cover.294  Thus, state governments escape 
the necessity of engaging in a thorough proportionality analysis regarding 
criminal disenfranchisement.  This lack of proportionality is unique.  No 
other restriction on a fundamental right in the United States exists with a 
similarly slight explicit rationale.  Like all fundamental rights, membership 
in civilized society mandates an eventual curtailment of personal liberty.  
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The right to vote is such a fundamental right in the United States, and it is no 
doubt subject to reasonable restrictions by state governments.  Yet, it is not 
acceptable that the voting restrictions inherent in felon disenfranchisement 
could exist on such impenetrable ground so as to avoid any test of 
compelling rationality or narrowly tailored purpose and application.  
At present, criminal disenfranchisement in the United States exists as an 
outright prohibition of varying duration on a fundamental and deeply 
democratic right.  Even worse, criminal disenfranchisement laws have an ill-
defined and arguably nonexistent regulatory purpose.  There is little doubt that 
any state interest served by felon disenfranchisement provisions could be 
achieved in ways that impose significantly less restriction on an individual’s 
fundamental right to vote.  This quality of American felon disenfranchisement 
law would force invalidation under the limitation clause in Section 36 of the 
South African Constitution.  The law is too broad, the right too important, the 
relationship between ends and means too tangential, and the availability of 
alternate measure so apparent that the law could not conceivably pass 
constitutional muster.  
Without adopting the exact provisions of the South African Constitution, 
the courts of the United States would be wise to heed its logic.  The right to 
vote is paramount in a free, democratic society.  Any restriction on suffrage 
must survive close scrutiny.  There is a clear danger in subversion and 
distortion of the political process if portions of citizens, and the interests they 
represent, are allowed to be roundly disenfranchised.  As quoted in NICRO, 
the Canadian Supreme Court has written:  
A government that restricts the franchise to a select portion of 
citizens is a government that weakens its ability to function as 
the legitimate representative of the excluded citizens, 
jeopardizes its claim to representative democracy, and erodes 
the basis of its right to convict and punish law-breakers.295 
The United States must re-examine the effect and purpose of criminal 
disenfranchisement laws.  If our country wants to embody the ideal of 
democratic legitimacy that we espouse, the current form of felon 
disenfranchisement must be recognized as destructive, illegitimate, and 
unacceptable.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Felon disenfranchisement is exceedingly unique in the United States in 
that it is a voting restriction that has steadfastly resisted change in the fifty 
years of voting reform promulgated by the legislation and judicial opinions 
of the Civil Rights Era.  This is particularly exceptional given that felon 
disenfranchisement laws harshly and disproportionately affect minority 
populations, particularly African-Americans.  
While the larger issue of the criminal justice system remains in flux, there 
is evidence the pendulum may be shifting in regard to an over-burdened and 
out of control system of criminal conviction and incarceration in the United 
States.  Reform of felon disenfranchisement laws will help speed this shift.  
By restricting convicted criminals from voting, state governments are 
suppressing the political voice of the very population most affected by the 
sky rocketing rates of incarceration of the past thirty-five years.  Felon 
disenfranchisement has effectively ensured that those most affected by our 
current age of mass incarceration have no political voice in the United States. 
Further, there is the ever-present and complex element of race in both the 
felon disenfranchisement laws of the United States and in the rationale 
behind the firm protection of voting rights in South Africa.  For numerous 
reasons—many relating to unfortunate but enduring vestiges of the American 
criminal justice system’s racially discriminatory past—African-Americans 
are affected significantly and disproportionately by felon disenfranchisement 
laws. This should not be ignored.  The United States must reconcile its 
tarnished history with its admirable aspirations for the future.  Our country 
must recognize that even absent intentional discrimination, any law that has 
such effect must be questioned.  In a country that fifty years ago 
disenfranchised black voters by overt machinations of law, the impact and 
rationale of felon disenfranchisement must be revisited and more closely 
interrogated. 
